Carrying out cross-border river water resources cooperation is an effective way to solve the increasingly severe global shortage of freshwater resources and alleviate the conflict between resources and the environment. In order to analyze the strategic choices of various basin countries and promote the development of cross-border water resources cooperation, this paper introduces the excess benefits of cooperation, income distribution ratio, opportunity benefits, penalty costs and other influencing factors, and uses the evolutionary game model to discuss the dynamic evolution process of the game strategy of the basin countries and influencing factors. Further use the numerical simulation method to study the evolution law of inter-state strategies in cross-border river basins. The research shows that the lower the cost of water resources cooperation among river basin countries, the higher the excess returns generated by cooperative development, and the smaller the difference between the opportunity benefit of betrayal of cooperation and the penalty cost, all of which are conducive to the stable strategy of evolutionary games to cooperate with river basin countries development direction evolution. The distribution ratio of excess revenue affects the cooperation between countries in the basin, and the direction of influence depends on the cost and revenue distribution ratio of the input of both parties. Based on the discussion on the evolution law of inter-state cooperation in cross-border river basins, it can further provide reference for global cross-border river water resource dispute settlement and cooperative development.