(1.Key Laboratory of the Pearl River Estuary Regulation and Protection of Ministry of Water Resources,Guangzhou 510611, China;2.Pearl River Water Resources Research Institute,Guangzhou 510611, China;3.College of Water Conservancy and Hydropower Engineering, Hohai University, Nanjing 210098, China)
Since ecological compensation has economic effects and public participation effects, based on this feature, when systematically studying upstream and downstream environmental protection and ecological compensation, by defining specific variables that affect the behavior choices of both parties in the game, an environmental protection-ecological compensation between upstream and downstream is established the game model of cost-benefit. The results show that in order to protect the environment and delay economic development, the upstream will not implement the environmental protection strategy.If the downstream area needs to give a large compensation, it will not implement the ecological compensation measures; the implementation of environmental protection strategies in upstream areas and the adoption of ecological compensation measures in downstream areas need to be based on certain conditions. The weaker the initial economic situation of the upstream, the lower the willingness of the upstream region to carry out environmental protection; the greater the compensation from the downstream to the upstream, the greater the compensation in the downstream the willingness to take measures will decrease.The better the initial economic situation in the downstream area, the higher the willingness to take compensation measures in the downstream area. When conducting ecological compensation game research on upstream and downstream stakeholders, we must consider their own development status.
郑江丽,杨川,张康,等.上下游区域间环境保护与生态补偿的博弈研究[J].水利经济,2023,41(1):84-88ZHENG Jiangli, YANG Chuan, ZHANG Kang, et al.(Game study on environmental protection-ecological compensation between upstream and downstream regions[J]. Journal of Economics of Water Resources,2023,41(1):84-88.(in Chinese))Copy