The introduction of social capital into contract management for water conservation has broad application prospects, while its profit distribution mechanism is not perfect, which becomes one of the main obstacles to the implementation of the promotion. The game relationship between the major stakeholders of contract management for water conservation is analyzed based on its characteristics. The Shapley model is corrected according to the investment costs, water-saving effects and different risk factors of parties involved so as to overcome the original defects. After correction, the wave-saving profit switches to water-saving service company from water-saving users and investors, and the water-saving service company and users get the largest profits. Through empirical analysis, the distribution results obtained by the corrected model are more reasonable.
刘德艳,尹庆民.基于修正Shapley模型的合同节水管理利益分配研究[J].水利经济,2016,34(3):53-58LIU Deyan, YIN Qingmin.(Profit distribution of contract management for water conservation based on corrected Shapley model[J]. Journal of Economics of Water Resources,2016,34(3):53-58.(in Chinese))复制