基于演化博弈的水利工程建设市场主体政府监管模式研究
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F426.91

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住房和城乡建设部2018年科学技术项目计划(2018-K8-023);广东省水利科技计划创新项目(2017-04);国家社会科学基金(17BGL156);中央高校基本科研业务费专项(2018B53014,2017B35214)


Governmentsupervision modes for market entities of construction of water conservancy projects based on evolutionary game theory
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    摘要:

    基于水利工程建设市场主体政府监管模式问题,明晰了政府监管部门与水利工程建设市场主体两者的策略选择集合;再针对不同的政府监管模式分别构建了基于博弈双方的复制动态方程;剖析了不同情形下政府监管部门与水利工程建设市场主体两者策略选择的演化路径;最后通过对博弈支付矩阵赋值在不同情形下的策略选择进行仿真,为政府监管部门的战略决策提供理论依据,并有益于水利工程建设市场主体做出科学决策。

    Abstract:

    The set of strategic choices between the government supervision authorities and the market entities of construction of water conservancy project is first clarified based on the government supervision modes for the market entities of construction of water conservancy projects. Secondly, the replication dynamic equations for different government supervision modes are established based on the two sides of the game. Then the evolution path of the two strategies in different situations is deeply analyzed. Finally, through the evaluation of the game payment matrix, the strategic selection in different situations is simulated, which provides a theoretical basis for the strategic decision of the government supervision departments, and it is beneficial to the scientific decision-making of the market entities of construction of water conservancy projects.

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费凯,王小环,朱晓婧,等.基于演化博弈的水利工程建设市场主体政府监管模式研究[J].水利经济,2019,37(4):56-62.(FEI Kai, WANG Xiaohuan, ZHU Xiaojing, et al. Governmentsupervision modes for market entities of construction of water conservancy projects based on evolutionary game theory[J]. Journal of Economics of Water Resources,2019,37(4):56-62.(in Chinese))

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  • 收稿日期:2018-11-14
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  • 在线发布日期: 2019-08-28
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