水利风景区PPP项目政府与社会资本方利益协调行为策略研究
作者:
作者单位:

(1.河海大学商学院,江苏 南京 211100;2.江苏省水资源与可持续发展研究中心,江苏 南京 210024)

作者简介:

吴兆丹(1988—),女,副教授,博士,主要从事水资源经济及管理研究。E-mail:wuzhaodan@hhu.edu.cn

通讯作者:

中图分类号:

F205

基金项目:

国家社会科学基金重大项目(19ZDA084)


Study on behavior strategies of the government and social capital side for interest coordination in the water park PPP projects
Author:
Affiliation:

(1.Business School, Hohai University, Nanjing 211100, China; 2.Jiangsu Research Center of Water Resources and Sustainable Development, Nanjing 210024, China)

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    摘要:

    为促进水利风景区PPP项目中政府与社会资本方之间的利益协调,保障项目顺利建设运营,研究双方之间利益协调行为策略,并在博弈分析中同时考虑政府的宏观管理者和项目微观参与主体双重身份。采用静态博弈探寻政府和社会资本方的纳什均衡,构建演化博弈模型动态分析双方的行为策略并对该博弈过程进行仿真。仿真结果表明:在政府采取“不积极”策略所承担的风险成本大于“积极”策略所付出的项目建设运行成本、社会资本方采取“投机”策略所承担的风险成本大于“努力”策略所付出的项目建设运行成本的情况下,“积极、努力”在静态博弈和动态博弈中均为均衡策略;否则,要实现“积极、努力”的均衡策略,需满足政府获得的社会生态效益远大于支出的可行性缺口补贴,且社会资本方获得的品牌效应、社会影响力、政府奖励等附加收益和可行性缺口补贴之和远多于转投向其他经营领域所获得的收益。提出了完善水利风景区PPP项目收益分配、风险分担及政策保障机制,建立政府和社会资本方沟通机制,加强对水利风景区PPP项目的监管力度等对策。

    Abstract:

    In order to promote the interest coordination between the government and social capital side in PPP projects of the water park, and ensure the smooth construction and operation of the project, the behavior strategy of the two sides is carried out for the first time, and the government roles of both the macro manager and the micro participant of the project are considered in the game analysis. Static game is adopted to explore the Nash equilibrium between the government and social capital, while the evolutionary game model is constructed to dynamically analyze their behavioral strategies with the simulation process. It is concluded that when the risk cost of the government taking the inactive strategy is greater than the cost of the active strategy, and the risk cost of the social capital taking the speculative strategy is greater than the cost of the effort strategy, (active, effort) is the equilibrium strategy in both static and dynamic games. Otherwise, aiming to realize the equilibrium (active, effort) strategy, it is necessary to ensure that the government's social and ecological benefits should be much larger than the viability gap funding, and for the social capital side, the sum of additional benefits like brand effect, social influence and government rewards, and the viability gap funding, should be much larger than the benefits gained by switching to other business fields. Afterwards, the corresponding countermeasures are put forward, including improving the benefit distribution, risk sharing and policy guarantee mechanism of PPP projects in water park, establishing communication mechanism between the government and social capital side, and strengthening the supervision of PPP projects in water park.

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吴兆丹,李彤,王诗琪,等.水利风景区PPP项目政府与社会资本方利益协调行为策略研究[J].水利经济,2022,40(4):84-90WU Zhaodan, LI Tong, WANG Shiqi, et al.(Study on behavior strategies of the government and social capital side for interest coordination in the water park PPP projects[J]. Journal of Economics of Water Resources,2022,40(4):84-90.(in Chinese))

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  • 收稿日期:2022-01-26
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  • 在线发布日期: 2022-07-26
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