河长制下农村河道治理的多元利益主体演化博弈分析
作者:
中图分类号:

X523

基金项目:

教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目(19YJAZH068);中央高校基本科研业务费专项(2018B25414);江苏省社会科学基金(19GLB023)


Evolutionary game analysis of multi-stakeholder in rural river regulation under River Chief System
Author:
  • 摘要
  • | |
  • 访问统计
  • |
  • 参考文献
  • |
  • 相似文献
  • | |
  • 文章评论
    摘要:

    目前我国农村河道污染问题十分严重,厘清多元主体的利益关系是破解河长制下农村河道治理困境的关键所在。在假设博弈主体均为有限理性的条件下,利用演化博弈工具研究了河长制下农村河道治理的问题。界定了农村河道治理过程的农村河长、职能机构、农村居民3个重要主体,并且分析了其策略选择及相互关系;利用演化博弈工具探讨了三方的演化过程,并对其渐进稳定性进行分析,讨论了不同主体的演化稳定策略;针对演化博弈分析结果,同时考虑非设定条件的影响,从规范河长绩效考评标准、完善职能机构奖惩机制、构建河长制信息化平台等多个角度对农村河道治理问题提出建议。

    Abstract:

    At present, the problem of rural river pollution in China is very severe. Clarifying the relationship among the stakeholders is the key to solve the dilemma of rural river management under the River Chief System. Under the assumption of the stakeholders' bounded rationality, the evolutionary game tool is used to study the problem of rural river management under the River Chief System. Firstly, three important stakeholders are defined in the rural river management: rural river chiefs, functional institutions and rural residents, and their strategic choices as well as interrelationships are analyzed. Secondly, the evolution of the three stakeholders is discussed by using the evolutionary game tool, and the gradual stability of the evolution model is analyzed. The evolutionary stability strategies of different stakeholders are discussed. Finally, according to the model analysis results and the influences of non-set conditions, some suggestions for the rural river governance issues are proposed for the smooth implementation of the river system in rural areas, such as standardizing the performance evaluation criteria for river chiefs, improving the reward and punishment mechanism of functional institutions, and constructing the information platform of River Chief System.

    参考文献
    [1] 杨卫兵,丰景春,张可.农村居民水环境治理支付意愿及影响因素研究:基于江苏省的问卷调查[J].中南财经政法大学学报,2015(4):58-65.
    [2] 周建国,熊烨.“河长制”:持续创新何以可能:基于政策文本和改革实践的双维度分析[J].江苏社会科学,2017(4):38-47.
    [3] 郑开元,李雪松.基于公共物品理论的农村水环境治理机制研究[J].生态经济,2012(3):162-165.
    [4] 雷玉桃.流域水环境管理的博弈分析[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2006(1):122-126.
    [5] WHITELAA G, VAUGHAN H, CRAIG B, et al. Establishing the Canadian community monitoring network [J]. Environmental Monitoring and Assessment, 2003, 88(1-3):409-418.
    [6] GERA W. Public participation in environmental governance in the Philippines: the challenge of consolidation in engaging the state[J]. Land Use Policy, 2016,52:501-510.
    [7] 于潇,孙小霞,郑逸芳,苏时鹏,黄森慰.农村水环境网络治理思路分析[J].生态经济,2015,31(5):150-154.
    [8] 张红.公共物品理论视角下农村水环境污染问题及治理对策[J].水利经济,2017,35(3):48-52.
    [9] 赖苹,曹国华,朱勇.基于微分博弈的流域水污染治理区域联盟研究[J].系统管理学报,2013,22(03):308-316.
    [10] 曲富国,孙宇飞.基于政府间博弈的流域生态补偿机制研究[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2014,24(11):83-88.
    [11] 张蔚文,刘飞,王新艳.基于博弈论的非点源污染控制模型探讨[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2011,21(08):142-146.
    [12] 杜焱强,苏时鹏,孙小霞.农村水环境治理的非合作博弈均衡分析[J].资源开发与市场,2015,31(3):321-326.
    [13] DUNGUMARO E W, MADULU N F. Public participation in integrated water resources management: the case of Tanzania [J].Physics & Chemistry of the Earth(Parts A/B/C),2003,28(20):1009-1014.
    [14] 许玲燕,杜建国,汪文丽.农村水环境治理行动的演化博弈分析[J].中国人口·资源与环境,2017,27(5):17-26.
    [15] 常建伟,赵刘威,杜建国.企业环境行为的监管演化博弈分析和稳定性控制:基于系统动力学[J].系统工程,2017,35(10):79-87.
    [16] 宋国君,冯时,王资峰,傅毅明.中国农村水环境管理体制建设[J].环境保护,2009(9):26-29.
    [17] 王烨冰,李国志.农民参与水环境治理的国际经验和模式构建:以中国浙江省丽水市为例[J].世界农业,2015(10):55-59.
    [18] 范永茂,殷玉敏.跨界环境问题的合作治理模式选择:理论讨论和三个案例[J].公共管理学报,2016,13(2):63-75,155-156.
    [19] 丁雪丽,张玲玲.整体性治理视角下的河长制评析[J].水利经济,2018,36(3):57-62.
    [20] 刘美玲,石高平.流域水污染的协作治理研究[J].水利经济,2018,36(2):54-58.
    [21] 刘鸿志,刘贤春,周仕凭,等.关于深化河长制制度的思考[J].环境保护,2016,44(24):43-46.
    [22] 黄爱宝.“河长制”:制度形态与创新趋向[J].学海,2015(4):141-147.
    [23] 陈美璇,傅晓华,孙名浩.论河长制的理论基础与实践创新[J].中南林业科技大学学报(社会科学版),2018,12(2):6-11.
    [24] 陈景云,许崇涛.河长制在省(区、市)间扩散的进程与机制转变:基于时间、空间与层级维度的考察[J].环境保护,2018,46(14):49-54.
    [25] 刘超.环境法视角下河长制的法律机制建构思考[J].环境保护,2017,45(9):24-29.
    [26] 王俊杰,陈金木,潘静雯.水利立法后评估体系构建研究[J].水利经济,2018,36(5):53-56.
    [27] 沈晓梅,姜明栋,钟冠宇.全面推行河长制的战略环境分析与对策[J].水利经济,2018,36(3):35-38.
    [28] 姜明栋,沈晓梅,王彦滢,等.江苏省河长制推行成效评价和时空差异研究[J].南水北调与水利科技,2018,16(3):201-208.
    [29] 郭清斌,邹结富,陈积微,等.基于面板数据的中国区域水环境污染EKC分析[J].水利经济,2018,36(2):49-53.
    引证文献
    网友评论
    网友评论
    分享到微博
    发 布
引用本文

庞庆华,杨晓卉,姜明栋.河长制下农村河道治理的多元利益主体演化博弈分析[J].水利经济,2019,37(5):59-65.(PANG Qinghua, YANG Xiaohui, JIANG Ming-dong. Evolutionary game analysis of multi-stakeholder in rural river regulation under River Chief System[J]. Journal of Economics of Water Resources,2019,37(5):59-65.(in Chinese))

复制
分享
文章指标
  • 点击次数:1586
  • 下载次数: 1970
  • HTML阅读次数: 0
  • 引用次数: 0
历史
  • 收稿日期:2019-03-23
  • 在线发布日期: 2019-10-10