In order to deeply analyze the dynamic transfer of internal control rights of social capital, the fairness concern preference is incorporated into the process of the transfer of control rights of water conservancy PPP projects, and the game of resource and power redistribution of different participants is studied based on evolutionary game model analysis and simulation experiments. The results show that: (1) Reasonable degree of equity is helpful to enhance the cooperation between social capital. (2) From the perspective of equity concern, the probability of active cooperation between the two parties is negatively correlated with the proportion of control transfer, positively correlated with additional management cost, residual value sharing, and punishment intensity, but not correlated with the active cooperation cost of professional firms. (3) Professional firms tend to promote the transfer of control by improving residual value sharing which can bring more intuitive perception of fairness. For investors, only when the effort level and potential income of professional companies reach the expectations of investors, they are likely to give up part of the control right to encourage professional companies.