水利基础设施PPP项目工期激励策略的三方演化博弈分析
作者:
作者单位:

(1.河海大学商学院,江苏 南京211100;2.河海大学项目管理研究所,江苏 南京211100;3.江苏省“世界水谷”与水生态文明协同创新中心,江苏 南京211100)

作者简介:

李明(1978—),男,副教授,博士,主要从事项目管理信息化研究。E-mail:lm@hhu.edu.cn

中图分类号:

F274

基金项目:

国家社会科学基金(17BGL156);住房和城乡建设部2018年科学技术项目计划(2018-K8-23);中央高校基本科研业务费专项(B220207039)


Tripartite evolutionary game model for PPP water infrastructure project duration incentive strategy
Author:
Affiliation:

(1.Business School, Hohai University, Nanjing 211100, China;2.Institute of Project Management, Nanjing 211100, China;3.Jiangsu Provincial Collaborative Innovation Center of World Water Valley and Water Ecological Civilization, Nanjing 211100, China)

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    摘要:

    水利基础设施PPP项目建设工期长,不确定因素多且复杂,水利基础设施PPP项目完工时间会影响公众对政府和建设主体的态度。考虑公众支持意愿对水利基础设施PPP项目建设工期的影响,本研究通过构建由公众、政府和水利基础设施PPP项目建设主体组成的三方演化博弈模型,分析不同情形下的均衡策略演化过程,并利用Matlab进行数值仿真分析。研究结果表明:在所有可能的均衡策略中,公众、政府和项目建设方存在四个稳定的策略,分别是支持,采取激励措施,不付出额外努力;支持,不采取激励措施,付出额外努力;不支持,采取激励措施,付出额外努力和支持,采取激励措施,付出额外努力。其中,公众支持能提高政府采取激励措施的积极性,从而鼓励水利基础设施PPP项目建设主体付出额外努力提前完工,扩大项目效益给公众带来“幸福感”的同时提升政府公信力,形成三方共赢的良性循环。

    Abstract:

    Water infrastructure PPP projects have a long construction period, which involves many uncertainties and complex factors, the completion time of water infrastructure PPP projects will affect the public’s attitude towards the government and the construction subject. Considering the influence of the public’s willingness to support on the construction duration of water infrastructure PPP projects, this paper analyzes the equilibrium strategy evolution process under different scenarios by establishing a three-way evolutionary game model consisting of the public, the government and the main body of water infrastructure PPP project construction, and then uses Matlab for numerical simulation analysis. The results show that there are four stable strategies for the public, the government and the project builders, which are (support, take incentives and make no extra efforts), (support, take no incentives and make extra efforts), (support, take incentives and make extra efforts) and (support, take incentives and make extra efforts). Among them, public willing to support can improve the willingness of government to take measures to encourage water infrastructure PPP projects to be completed ahead of schedule, which ultimately improves the project benefits and brings “happiness” to the public, thus increasing the government’s credibility and forming a virtuous cycle for all three parties.

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引用本文

李明,徐蓉.水利基础设施PPP项目工期激励策略的三方演化博弈分析[J].水利经济,2023,41(3):78-86.(LI Ming, XU Rong. Tripartite evolutionary game model for PPP water infrastructure project duration incentive strategy[J]. Journal of Economics of Water Resources,2023,41(3):78-86.(in Chinese))

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  • 收稿日期:2022-11-24
  • 在线发布日期: 2023-06-04