基于演化博弈的水生态PPP项目第三方监管策略
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TV93;F407.9

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河南省高等学校哲学社会科学应用研究重大项目(2017-YYZD-04)


Third-party supervision strategy of water ecological PPP project based on evolutionary game theory
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    摘要:

    政府与社会资本合作(public-private partnership,PPP)项目运营期较长,容易出现监管俘获从而削弱政府监管职能的问题。以政府方劣后为前提,引入独立的第三方监管机构,对水生态PPP项目进行监管,构建博弈模型,从演化博弈的视角分析政府的奖惩策略对博弈双方主体行为的影响。模拟结果显示,监管机构对政府惩罚短期负面影响十分显著,但对长期影响较小;同时,仿真结果发现了政府奖励的范围,也找出了第三方监管机构成本与其监管绩效的关系。

    Abstract:

    Public private partnership(PPP)projects have a long operation period, which is prone to regulatory capture and weaken the regulatory function of the government. Based on the premise that the government is inferior, an independent third-party supervision agency is introduced to supervise the water ecological PPP project, and a game model is constructed to analyze the impact of the governments reward and punishment strategies on the behavior of the players from the perspective of evolutionary game. The simulation results show that the short-term negative impact of regulators on government punishment is very significant, but the long-term impact is small. At the same time, the simulation results find the scope of government rewards, and also find out the relationship between the cost of third-party regulators and their regulatory performance.

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张亚琼,何楠,杨丝雯,等.基于演化博弈的水生态PPP项目第三方监管策略[J].水资源保护,2021,37(4):166-172.(ZHANG Yaqiong, HE Nan, YANG Siwen, et al. Third-party supervision strategy of water ecological PPP project based on evolutionary game theory[J]. Water Resources Protection,2021,37(4):166-172.(in Chinese))

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  • 收稿日期:2020-03-29
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  • 在线发布日期: 2021-07-21
  • 出版日期: 2021-07-20