In addition to the adjustment cost, the resource-based enterprises爷green behavior choice may also be faced with high sunk costs. In order to avoid falling into the “resource advantage trap冶, the government tries to restrain the negative externalities of regulated enterprises through strict environmental regulation. Through building a dynamic game model between the environmental regulatory authorities and the resource-based enterprises and introducing the green reputation to the environmental supervision department and the enterprise behavior restriction, benefit into the model, the paper explores whether environmental regulation can effectively control environmental pollution and induce resource-based enterprises to choose green behavior. The study shows that thestrict environmental regulations may trigger enterprises to choose green behaviors, but the “regulation capture” occurs between the environmental supervision department and the resource-based enterprises. Through government credibility loss and benefits, the influence of media disclosure and the attitude of the stakeholders, the reputation mechanism may effectively restrain the “capture of regulation” and curb the possibility of rent-seeking by enterprises and then the choice of green behavior in the resource-based enterprises is forced indirectly. The increase of illegal punishment of the resource-based enterprises has reduced the opportunity of rent-seeking of the supervision department while forcing enterprises adopting green behaviors.