Based on the government system of fiscal decentralization, promotion championship and official governance, this paper establishes an analytical framework, and uses the panel data of 79 sampled prefecturelevel cities from 2012 to 2016 to analyze the impact of local governments’ competitive power on the contribution burden of employees’ pension insurance by using the bidirectional fixed effect model.We find that the financial competition power of local governments, economic growth yardstick competition power, and officials’ personal competition power can significantly influence the endowment insurance contribution, and the financial competition power can also strengthen the influence of economic growth yardstick competition power on endowment insurance contribution.The share of fiscal expenditure which represents the competitive power of fiscal expenditure has a negative relationship with the endowment insurance contribution. The competitive power of GDP growth which represents the yardstick competitive power has a negative relationship with endowment insurance contribution. The analysis of the influence of personal competitive power of officials on endowment insurance contribution shows that there is a positive relationship between the tenure of mayor, tenure of party secretary and endowment insurance contribution. The age of the mayor, the age of the secretary of the Municipal Party Committee and the contribution burden of the pension insurance of the employees all showed a ushaped distribution, with the peak of 54,56 years old. The conclusion shows that the local government governance structure makes the local governments in China have the competition of endowment insurance contribution burden similar to the international tax burden competition.